Sight and sound out of synch: Fragmentation and renormalisation of audiovisual integration and subjective timing by Freeman, E. D. et al.
Freeman, E. D., Ipser, A., Palmbaha, A., Paunoiu, D., Brown, P., Lambert, C., Leff, A. & Driver, J. 
(2013). Sight and sound out of synch: Fragmentation and renormalisation of audiovisual integration 
and subjective timing. Cerebral Cortex, 49(10), pp. 2875-2887. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2013.03.006 
City Research Online
Original citation: Freeman, E. D., Ipser, A., Palmbaha, A., Paunoiu, D., Brown, P., Lambert, C., 
Leff, A. & Driver, J. (2013). Sight and sound out of synch: Fragmentation and renormalisation of 
audiovisual integration and subjective timing. Cerebral Cortex, 49(10), pp. 2875-2887. doi: 
10.1016/j.cortex.2013.03.006 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13398/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Freeman McGurk Cortex Accepted.docx 
 
Sight and sound out of synch: Fragmentation and 
renormalisation of audiovisual integration and 
subjective timing.  
 
Elliot D. Freeman1 
Alberta Ipser1 
Austra Palmbaha1 
Diana Paunoiu1 
Peter Brown2, 
Christian Lambert3 
Alex Leff4 
Jon Driver4 
 
1. City University London 
2. John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford University 
3. St Georges, University of London 
4. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London 
 
 
 
Correspondence to: 
Elliot D. Freeman 
City University 
Northampton Square  
London EC1V 0HB 
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7040 0102  
Fax: +44 (0)20 7040 8580 
email: elliot.freeman@city.ac.uk 
            
  
2 
Abstract 
The sight and sound of a person speaking or a ball bouncing may seem simultaneous, but their 
corresponding neural signals are spread out over time as they arrive at different multisensory brain 
sites. How subjective timing relates to such neural timing remains a fundamental neuroscientific 
and philosophical puzzle. A dominant assumption is that temporal coherence is achieved by sensory 
resynchronisation or recalibration across asynchronous brain events. This assumption is easily 
confirmed by estimating subjective audiovisual timing for groups of subjects, which is on average 
similar across different measures and stimuli, and approximately veridical. But few studies have 
examined normal and pathological individual differences in such measures. 
 
Case PH, with lesions in pons and basal ganglia, hears people speak before seeing their lips move. 
Temporal order judgements (TOJ) confirmed this: voices had to lag lip-movements (by ~200ms) to 
seem synchronous to PH. Curiously, voices had to lead lips (also by ~200ms) to maximise the 
McGurk illusion (a measure of audiovisual speech integration). Thus PH’s timing was still veridical 
on average across measures. Similar kinds of discrepancies were also found in age-matched control 
participants. Most surprisingly, normal individual differences in TOJ and McGurk timing correlated 
negatively: subjects needing an auditory lag for subjective simultaneity needed an auditory lead for 
maximal McGurk, and vice versa. This generalised to the Stream-Bounce illusion. Such antagonism 
seems opposed to good sensory resynchronisation, yet average timing across tasks was still near-
veridical. 
 
Our findings reveal surprising disunity of subjective timing within and between subjects. To 
account for this we propose that the neural timing within different mechanisms is perceived relative 
to the average timing across mechanisms. Such renormalisation fully explains the curious 
antagonistic relationship between disparate timing estimates in PH and healthy participants, and 
how they can still perceive the timing of external events correctly, on average. 
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
 
When a person speaks, we usually expect to hear their voice at the same time as seeing their lips 
move. Furthermore, if we watch their lips, it often helps us to hear their voice better, via 
‘speechreading’ (Sumby and Pollack, 1954). Two distinct kinds of processes are implied by such 
observations: synchronisation and integration. Firstly, we are sensitive to when auditory and visual 
events are occurring at the same time (Alais and Carlile, 2005; King, 2005; Kopinska and Harris, 
2004; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003). Secondly, the ability to benefit from the combination of modalities, 
as in speech-reading, requires that auditory and visual information be brought together in the brain 
and integrated. So automatic and compelling is such integration that artificial mismatches between 
sound and vision can easily induce illusory changes in the perceived location, timing or actual 
interpretation of the stimuli (Bertelson and Radeau, 1981; Howard and Templeton, 1966; McGurk 
and MacDonald, 1976; Witkin, Wapner, and Leventhal, 1952). 
 
It is easy to take for granted that audiovisual events are always synchronised and integrated 
correctly. But here, we present the first ever confirmed case of a patient who hears peoples’ voices 
before he sees their lips move. Testing this individual in comparison with neurologically healthy 
participants gave us the unique opportunity to address two issues: Firstly, we ask whether PH’s 
auditory leading phenomenon is selective for subjective synchrony or whether his audiovisual 
integration is also affected. This addresses a current debate over whether optimal integration 
depends on achieving subjective synchrony, or whether integration obeys independent temporal 
constraints (Arnold, Johnston, and Nishida, 2005; Martin, Giersch, Huron, and van Wassenhove, 
2013; Munhall, Gribble, Sacco, and Ward, 1996; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2007, 2009; van 
Wassenhove, Grant, and Poeppel, 2007). Secondly, PH’s pathological desynchronisation might 
provide insight into the deeper question of how (or indeed whether) sensory synchronisation is 
normally achieved, which has long perplexed neuroscientists and philosophers (Dennett and 
Kinsbourne, 1995; Harris, Harrar, Jaekl, and Kopinska, 2008; Keetels and Vroomen, 2012; Spence 
and Squire, 2003; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010; Zeki and Bartels, 1998). We consider this issue first. 
 
Multisensory synchronisation 
The problem of synchronisation is exemplified by the maxim known as Segal’s law: 'With one clock 
you always know the time; with two you are never sure'. Does the brain also have multiple clocks, 
and if so, does this create a similar uncertainty? There are many multimodal convergence zones in 
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the brain (Bushara, Grafman, and Hallett, 2001; Cappe, Rouiller, and Barone, 2009; Driver and 
Noesselt, 2008; Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Macaluso and Driver, 2005; Meredith, Nemitz, 
and Stein, 1987; Stevenson, Altieri, Kim, Pisoni, and James, 2010), and to get there, auditory and 
visual signals must traverse different routes and distances, thus most likely arriving at different 
times (Arnold, Clifford, and Wenderoth, 2001; Aschersleben and Prinz, 1995; Halliday and 
Mingay, 1964; Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; Stone et al., 2001). Consequently each area will have 
different information about when visual and auditory events occurred (Scharnowski, Rees, and 
Walsh, 2013). This entails a ‘multiple-clocks’ uncertainty for knowing the absolute and relative 
timing of external events. 
 
Despite such systemic and intrinsic asynchrony, subjects still often recognise when auditory and 
visual sources are synchronous (Harris et al., 2008), at least for proximal if not always for distal 
stimuli (Alais and Carlile, 2005; Arnold et al., 2005; Heron, McGraw, and Horoshenkov, 2007; 
King, 2005; Kopinska and Harris, 2004; Stone et al., 2001; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003; Vroomen and 
Keetels, 2010). Shifts in subjective simultaneity following adaptation to asynchrony provide further 
evidence for mechanisms functioning at least locally to resynchronise temporal discrepancies 
between modalities (Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, and Nishida, 2004; Hanson, Heron, and Whitaker, 
2008; Miyazaki, Yamamoto, Uchida, and Kitazawa, 2006; Yamamoto, Miyazaki, Iwano, and 
Kitazawa, 2012). However, individuals differ widely and consistently with respect to the objective 
audiovisual asynchrony which they perceive as subjectively synchronous (the Point of Subjective 
Simultaneity, PSS; Stone et al., 2001). This may depend intrinsically on the time for neural 
conduction and processing of signals, which may differ between stimuli and individuals (Arnold et 
al., 2001; Aschersleben and Prinz, 1995; Halliday and Mingay, 1964; Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; 
Stone et al., 2001), though attentional biases may also account for some apparent individual 
differences in multisensory timing (Spence and Parise, 2010; Spence, Shore, and Klein, 2001). 
Furthermore, even within the same subjects given the same stimuli, different tasks produce 
uncorrelated estimates of PSS (Van Eijk, Kohlrausch, Juola, and Van De Par, 2008) though such 
variations may depend on strategic variables (García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2012; Schneider 
and Bavelier, 2003; Van Eijk et al., 2008). Thus resynchronising mechanisms, if they exist (Zeki 
and Bartels, 1998), may not function perfectly. 
 
If there were a single specialised mechanism for multisensory synchronisation, one might expect to 
find individuals for whom different modalities have been chronically desynchronised following a 
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brain trauma. Loss of acuity for temporal order has been observed following temporal lobectomy 
(Sherwin and Efron, 1980), but in general temporal processing remains puzzlingly resistant to 
neurological damage (Wiener, Matell, and Coslett, 2011). Indeed, there is only one previously 
reported case of apparently acquired sensory desynchronisation (Hamilton, Shenton, and Coslett, 
2006). Hamilton et al (2006) described patient AWF who claimed to experience ‘a perceived 
temporal mismatch’ (Abstract). However they did not specify whether vision actually preceded or 
lagged audition, and did not formally quantify the temporal mismatch using objective measures, for 
example by measuring performance across a range of audio-visual asynchronies. Thus to date, 
evidence that sensory synchronisation can be pathologically impaired rests largely on AWF’s 
subjective report, which is not very specific. 
 
Dependence of integration on synchronisation 
While investigations of synchronisation have typically focused on temporal relationships between 
modalities (e.g. Harris et al., 2008), the multiple-clocks problem also logically applies between 
different processes. Here we consider two such notional processes, supporting subjective temporal 
judgements versus those that serve to integrate inputs from different modalities. We ask whether 
sound and vision are optimally integrated when they are subjectively synchronous. These processes 
are not logically the same, and evidence from functional brain imaging suggests they are supported 
by distinct brain mechanisms (Bertini, Leo, Avenanti, and Làdavas, 2010; Miller and D’Esposito, 
2005; Stevenson et al., 2010). Given such separation, and the multiple-clocks' problem which that 
entails, any evidence of dependence of integration on synchronisation could be indicative of 
synchronising mechanisms operating between distinct cognitive processes, not just between 
modalities as a whole.  
 
It seems intuitive that such unity of timing across processes should be achieved. Such an intuition 
might be based on the assumption that single physical events should be associated with a unitary 
percept (Welch and Warren, 1980). It would indeed be surprising if we consciously perceived 
different aspects of the same event as occurring at different times (though in some cases it seems we 
do; Arnold et al., 2001; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997). Evidence suggests that the brain does actively 
strive to maintain synchrony across processes. For example in the ‘unity effect’, stimuli which are 
readily integrated (such as meaningful speech sounds and lip-movements) tend to be judged as 
synchronous even if they are actually not (Vatakis and Spence, 2007). Conversely, integration may 
depend on a prior decision about the temporal correspondence of auditory and visual streams. For 
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example, in the classic McGurk illusion (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976), the combination of a 
voice saying /ba/ and a face mouthing [ga] often results in hearing the syllable /da/, while auditory 
/da/ with visual [ba] can sound like /ba/, but such visual interference declines (on average) with 
increasing asynchrony between voice and lips (Munhall et al., 1996; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2007, 
2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007). Similarly for non-speech stimuli, we are more likely (on 
average) to perceive two balls as bouncing off each other when their collision is accompanied 
simultaneously by a sound, compared to when these auditory and visual events are asynchronous 
(Sekuler, Sekuler, and Lau, 1997). Though such findings demonstrate dependence of integration on 
veridical synchrony, on average across participants, its critical dependence on individuals’ own 
subjective synchrony has not been examined to date. 
 
The above positive evidence suggests that the brain actively benefits from, and actively strives for 
subjective unity across its different process. But however desirable, a unitary percept may not 
always be achieved. Some observations appear to challenge the intuitive dependence of 
multisensory integration on audiovisual synchronisation (Spence and Ngo, 2012). For example in 
the McGurk effect, Soto-Faraco & Alsius (2007, 2009) used a dual task paradigm to measure 
McGurk interference and subjective synchrony as a function of audiovisual asynchrony. They found 
that illusory McGurk percepts were often reported even for audiovisual stimuli that could be 
reliably identified as asynchronous (on average across participants). Such ‘dual perception’ of good 
lip-voice integration despite a detectable audiovisual asynchrony hints that unity can be violated, 
and thus in principle measures of subjective integration and synchronisation might be based on their 
own stimulus inputs and correspondence mechanisms rather than shared or synchronised 
mechanisms. Some doubt remains about this however, because integration and synchronisation 
judgements still centered on similar near-veridical asynchronies (on average), and thus could still be 
subject to common synchronising mechanisms. Furthermore, any apparent differences between the 
measures might just reflect different criteria for deciding whether two asynchronous events from 
different modalities should be integrated or segmented, compared when deciding whether the two 
events are synchronous or asynchronous. The mismatch between measures was also small, though 
note that these measures were averaged across observers, which might conceal the true extent to 
which optimal timing may differ between mechanisms within individuals.  
 
Neuropsychological studies might contribute to this debate if cases could be found where brain 
lesions result in either selective impairment of either synchronisation or integration, or joint 
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impairment of both together. A case of the latter kind seems to be reported by Hamilton et al 
(2006), where the ‘temporal mismatch’ experienced by patient AWF coincided with an eliminated 
McGurk effect for veridically synchronous stimuli. However Hamilton et al did not test McGurk 
under different conditions of audiovisual asynchrony. Thus the critical evidence for true 
interdependence of synchronisation and integration functions was lacking, which would have been 
provided if the McGurk effect had been reinstated in AWF, for subjectively simultaneous stimuli.  
 
The present study 
From the above review it may be concluded that the question of how, or indeed whether, the brain 
can minimise discrepancies in timing between modalities and between cognitive processes, has not 
yet been satisfactorily resolved. Critical insights may be gained by studying individual differences 
between measures probing synchronisation and integration, and comparing natural variations in 
these measures with those acquired following brain injury. In particular, we can examine (1) 
whether PH is an example of a categorical breakdown of putative unifying mechanisms, or whether 
his lesions have merely shifted him along a continuum of disunity, where we may also find 
ourselves. We therefore ask, how unusual is PH (Experiment 1)? If highly abnormal, he could be 
‘the exception that proves the rule’, that unity and synchrony are normally achieved in individuals 
(albeit with inaccuracies). But exceptions can also ‘prove’ rules wrong. Our evidence, of large 
discrepancies between our two measures in PH and surprisingly also in normal subjects, suggests 
that asynchrony and disunity may rule instead. We can also ask (2) whether PH’s acquired 
subjective asynchrony is specific to perception of audiovisual temporal order or whether this affects 
the temporal tuning of audiovisual integration, and also how closely measures of integration 
correspond with measures of synchrony, within normal individuals. We assess integration in the 
McGurk effect (Experiment 2) and the Stream-Bounce illusion (Experiment 3). If multimodal 
integration and synchronisation of speech stimuli are based on dependent mechanisms, it seems 
straightforward to predict that individual differences for our two measures will correlate positively. 
Alternatively, a null correlation seems intuitively likely if these mechanisms were fully 
independent. We find neither. Our counterintuitive results call for a revised understanding of how 
the brain solves the multiple-clocks problem, which we propose. 
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Our study simply replicated the dual-task paradigm of Soto-Faraco & Alsius (2007) with PH and 
normal controls. On each trial, we presented brief movies with a range of audiovisual asynchronies. 
There then followed two tasks, temporal order judgement (TOJ) and phoneme discrimination, to 
obtain two concurrent measures of the audiovisual asynchrony that (1) is perceived as synchronous, 
and (2) induces maximal integration, as measured by the strength of the McGurk illusion. We then 
analysed individual differences on these measures rather than just average performance.  
 
As PH's phenomenology is of a distinct temporal order, of lips lagging voices, TOJ was chosen to 
probe his subjective report as directly as possible. We were also concerned that the alternative 
paradigm, Simultaneity Judgement, might be performed heuristically on the basis of the quality of 
speech integration, and thus our measure of subjective timing in PH and control subjects might have 
been confounded by changes in integration as a function of asynchrony. 
 
Before reporting the methods and results of our experiments we first provide detailed 
documentation of case PH.  
 
PH case study 
PH, a retired pilot aged 67, first experienced auditory leading while watching television. He initially 
suspected poor dubbing, but then later noticed the same phenomenon in conversations with people. 
After seeking medical advice at his workplace, he was referred to Professor Peter Brown at his 
Queen Square neurology clinic, where we recruited him for this research. He also reports perceiving 
the sound of his own voice before the proprioception of his corresponding mouth and jaw 
movements. The onset seems to have been abrupt, not accompanied by any other symptoms, and 
initially progressing slowly but now stable according to his subjective reports, though becoming 
temporarily more intense when fatigued. He also reported experiencing difficulty in speech 
comprehension in noisy environments, though attributes this to tinnitus. In November 2007 he had 
surgery to treat pericarditis, and in 2008 he had developed generalised myasthenia gravis (anti-ACh 
receptor antibody and EMG positive). His current complaint came on 2-3 months after the onset of 
the myasthenia, however it is unknown to what extent these phenomena are related (Keesey, 1999). 
 
A routine neurological examination revealed no abnormalities. There was no evidence of 
fatiguability. Mild hearing loss for high frequencies was observed using audiometry. Performance 
in a standard battery of neuropsychological tests (Table 1) revealed generally high functioning with 
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no specific functional impairments. He showed above average Wechsler IQ (The Psychological 
Corporation, 1999) and near-perfect performance on tests of everyday attention (Robertson, 2006), 
and the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (Warrington and James, 1991), with the sole 
exception of silhouette identification (19/30). Sentence repetition (Spreen and Benton, 1969), 
performed while the speaker’s face was hidden from view, was perfect and immediate.  
 
Imaging 
High resolution MRI (500µm
3
) revealed two lesions. Lesion 1 was located in superior 
mesencephalon, at the left anterio-medial tip of the subthalamic nucleus (11.5mm left and 16.8mm 
posterior to the anterior commisure). Total lesion volume was 42mm
3
. Lesion 2 was located in mid-
brainstem within the right dorso-medial pontine nucleus at the level of middle cerebellar peduncle 
around the exit of the trigeminal nerve (see Figure 1). These were considered likely to represent 
small established lacunar infarcts. There was no evidence of an acute ischaemic lesion or 
microhaemorrhages.  
  
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) was undertaken using images from healthy subjects, to identify 
brain regions which are connected to the lesion sites (see Supplementary Methods S1 and 
Supplementary Figure 1). Results indicated that lesion 1 had ipsilateral projections predominately 
into the motor cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic-cortical relay loop, and a small projection with the 
Orbito-Frontal relay loop. Cortical projections were consistent with Limbic STN (Lambert et al., 
2012). Lesion 2 lay along the olivo-collicular pathway (Supplementary Figure 1), with largely 
ipsilateral projections to inferior colliculus and extending down to the medial territory of the peri-
olivary nucleus. There was also a possible involvement of the tectopontine pathway. This second 
lesion may be associated with the early auditory system. Both regions have been implicated in 
crossmodal interactions (Halverson and Freeman, 2010; Kolomiets et al., 2001), and in event timing 
(Teki, Grube, and Griffiths, 2011). 
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Methods 
Healthy Participants 
Experiment 1 had 10 participants similar in age to PH (59 to 74 years, mean 65, SD 5). Experiment 
2 had 27 neurologically healthy young subjects (18-28 years, mean 22), and included the results 
from the older age-matched controls. Data from four further participants were excluded, due to poor 
performance, resulting in  implausible estimates of subjective timing >300ms asynchrony, outside 
the typical range for multisensory integration (Vatakis, Ghazanfar, and Spence, 2008; Vatakis and 
Spence, 2007) and indicative of poor quality data and unreliable function fits. Experiment 3 (testing 
the Stream-Bounce illusion) had 24 participants aged 18-24, excluding two others who reported no 
‘bounce’ illusion. All participants were naïve to the specific aims of this study. Participants 
received a monetary reward. Procedures were approved by the local Psychology ethics committee 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Laboratory apparatus comprised an Apple Mac Mini, with Labtech speakers positioned either side 
of a 17" Sony HMD-A420 CRT display, viewed in darkness from 70cm. Mobile apparatus for older 
participants and PH comprised a Sony Vaio SZ1XP PC with built-in speakers and 13.3" LCD 
display, viewed from approximately 57cm. In both cases video mode was 1200 x 800 with a 60Hz 
refresh rate. Subjects responded using the cursor keys on the standard keyboard.  
McGurk stimuli were based on Soto-Faraco & Alsius (2007), which were kindly provided by the 
authors (see Figure 2 for dimensions, and Supplementary Video). Auditory /ba/ and /da/ phonemes 
(with white noise at 15% of maximum amplitude) were combined with visual lip-movements for 
[ba] and [ga]. The two incongruent pairings for eliciting the McGurk effect were /ba/+[ga]=’da’ and 
/da/+[ba]=’ba’ or ‘bda’. The other two ‘congruent’ pairings /ba/+[ba] and /da/+[ga] tend to be heard 
correctly. Background was set to the average RGB value across all pixels and frames. For the 
Stream-Bounce experiment, visual stimuli were two yellow circular at maximum contrast on a 
black background. Each moved from positions left and right above fixation, via the central fixation 
point, to opposite positions below fixation (see Figure 2 for dimensions, and Supplementary Video). 
Animations were accompanied by a 400Hz tone of 100ms duration, with the same manipulation of 
asynchrony as for the McGurk stimuli. Movies were followed by 9pt white text prompting 
responses, displayed centrally.  
 
We also tested PH with various biological and/or non-speech stimuli. Finger-click movies, of 
3000ms duration, showed a hand with the middle finger clicking against the thumb. Sequences 
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began with either the hand open (to provide predictive information) or closed. For scrambled-
speech stimuli, the soundtrack from the original McGurk stimuli was passed through a three-
channel noise vocoder using Praat software (version 5.1.21, http://www.praat.org), rendering the 
speech unintelligible but without affecting the spectral composition of the sound or the temporal 
sequence of amplitude modulations. The video sequence remained the same. Non-biological stimuli 
comprised a white square 1.67deg on each side) on a black background, presented for 200ms and 
paired with a white-noise burst of 200ms duration.   
 
Design 
In all experiments, we used a dual-task paradigm (Soto-Faraco & Alsius, 2007) (Figure 2) to obtain 
two concurrent measures of the audiovisual asynchrony that is (1) perceived as synchronous, and 
(2) optimal for maximum audiovisual integration, as measured by the McGurk effect. All 
experiments employed a repeated measures factorial design. For the audiovisual asynchrony 
manipulation, the soundtrack could be shifted forwards or backwards in time relative to the visual 
sequence over a range of ±500ms through nine equal steps of 125ms including zero (sound 
synchronous with video). In Experiments 1 and 2, an independent variable was the congruency of 
lip-movements with voice (see Stimuli above). There were two possible lip-voice combinations for 
each congruent/incongruent pairing.  Only incongruous conditions were used for assessing McGurk 
interference. Two dependent measures were obtained from two responses elicited after each trial, 
for temporal order judgments and phoneme identity/stream-bounce judgements respectively. 
 
Procedure 
Each trial began with a fixation display. Following a keypress and a blank interval (duration 
randomly selected from the range 1000±500ms), a movie was displayed for 2800ms. On each trial 
the audiovisual asynchrony and stimulus pairing were selected pseudo-randomly. Each stimulus 
pairing was presented at each of the nine possible asynchronies 8 to 10 times in pseudorandom 
order. Following movie offset, there were two successive forced-choice questions. Firstly, a 
temporal order judgement task (TOJ) asked whether the voice (or beep) onset preceded or followed 
the lip-movement (or visual collision). In Experiments 1 and 2, the second question elicited a 
phoneme discrimination, asking whether the voice said “ba” or “da” (a third option for ‘other’, used 
on only 0.3% ± 0.3%SEM of trials, was not included in further analysis). Subjects were encouraged 
to choose the option that sounded the closest to what they heard. In Experiment 3, this second 
question asked subjects to indicate whether they saw the balls bounce or stream through each other. 
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The additional tests performed by PH, with finger-clicks, flashes and noise-bursts, and scrambled 
speech, were all run as a single-task eliciting temporal order judgments.  
 
Analysis  
For TOJ, we plotted the proportion of ‘voice second’ responses (where the auditory onset was 
judged to lag the visual onset) as a psychometric function of actual auditory lag time in 
milliseconds (note that negative lag denotes an auditory lead). The proportion of ‘sound second’ 
values was typically below 50% for negative auditory lags (i.e. sound leads vision), and above 50% 
for positive auditory lags. A logistic function was then fitted to the psychometric data, using a 
maximum-likelihood algorithm provided by the PSIGNIFIT toolbox for Matlab (Wichmann and 
Hill, 2001). We could then read off from the fitted function the critical auditory lag corresponding 
to the participant’s Point of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS). This is the point at which the participant 
is at chance (50%) deciding whether the sound onset first or second relative to the visual onset. The 
same software was used to find the slope of the function and to derive 95% confidence intervals for 
both PSS and slope estimates, via a bootstrapping procedure. Finally, we estimated the additional 
auditory lag required for the participant to go from responding at chance to responding ‘voice 
second’ 75% of the time.  The resulting value quantifies the lag that can produce a Just Noticeable 
Difference (JND) between subjectively synchronous and asynchronous stimuli. 
 
For the phoneme discrimination task we obtained the proportion of trials in which the reported 
phoneme was consistent with the lipmovements, averaged across incongruous conditions only. For 
example, a ‘ba’ response to /da/+[ba] and a ‘da’ response to /ba/+[ga] were scored as ‘consistent’. 
This was plotted as a psychometric function of auditory lag. The data from each of the two 
incongruent conditions, plus the average across them, were fit using an asymmetric double sigmoid 
function (ADS, following van Wassenhove, 2007), which results in a bell-shaped curve with 
adjustable height, width and asymmetry, using the following equation: 
 
 
 
The optimal auditory lag for maximum McGurk interference (tMcG) from vision was read off at the 
peak of each of these interpolated functions and averaged, with 95% confidence intervals derived 
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from fits of 1000 bootstrapped samples. For stream-bounce judgments, ADS functions were fitted 
to the proportion of 'bounce' responses. 
 
Across subjects, mean (and standard deviation) of R
2
 values for goodness of fit of functions to the 
psychometric data were 0.89 (0.13) for the TOJ task, and 0.75 (0.18) for the phoneme 
discrimination task. 
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Results 
 
All inferential statistics reported in the following are based on parametric statistics, as data did not 
deviate significantly from normality [Kolmogorov-Smirnov p>.05].  
 
Experiment 1 
 
PH 
PH’s temporal order judgements corroborated his subjective report of voice leading lips. His Point 
of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS) was shifted away from veridical to 210ms auditory lag. This 
means that subjective synchrony could only be restored for PH by artificially lagging voices relative 
to lip-movements (by 210ms, see Table 2), at which point temporal order became indistinguishable 
(Figure 3a). Also very curiously, the optimal asynchrony for maximum McGurk interference 
(tMcG) showed almost exactly the opposite asynchrony (240ms auditory lead was required for 
optimum McGurk). Thus voices effectively lagged lip-movements for the purposes of audiovisual 
speech integration (Figure 3b). 
 
To investigate the generality of PH's auditory lead we tested him on a variety of biological and 
artificial non-speech stimuli, using single-task temporal order judgements. In separate single-task 
tests, we found PSS was closer to veridical for artificial stimuli (flash/noise-burst pairs: 2± 99ms 
auditory lag, 95% confidence interval), finger-clicks (with no significant difference between movies 
beginning from open or closed-hand positions: 64±85ms), and for unintelligible noise-vocoded 
speech (52±98ms). In contrast, a similar single-task paradigm with the original speech stimuli 
showed a similar PSS shift as in the dual-task situation 210±90ms). It may therefore be concluded 
that PH's PSS shift was specific to speech, and not dependent on the number of concurrent tasks. 
 
Comparison with controls 
How unusual is PH? Using a modified t test for comparing an individual’s test score with a small 
normative sample (Crawford and Howell, 1998), we found PH's tMcG was significantly greater 
than for 10 healthy age-matched participants [Crawford t(9) = 2.23, p=0.05]. The discrepancy 
between PH’s PSS and tMcG measures was also significantly greater than for the control sample 
[Crawford t(9) = 2.46, p=0.04]. On these measures PH therefore does seem abnormal. However his 
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these results graphically as psychometric functions for PH compared with the group average 
function. 
 
We repeated the analysis after collecting data from a further sample of 27 young participants (see 
Expt. 2) with similar results (Table 2). Relative to the tMcG measure, PH was again significantly 
deviant from young participants [(25) = 2.64, p=0.01], and from the whole combined-age sample  
[t(35) = 2.55, p=0.02]. The discrepancy between PSS and tMcG measures was also significant for 
the young [t(25) = 2.14, p=0.04] and combined-age sample [(35) = 2.25, p=0.03]. However, he was 
not deviant relative to the PSS for young [t(25) = 1.28, p=0.21] and the combined-age sample [t(35) 
= 1.37, p=0.18]. 
 
It is surprising to note that on the measure that reflects PH’s subjective report of voice leading lips, 
some healthy participants showed PSS values of comparable magnitude to PH (Figure 4a). Given 
that some normal participants seemed to show a similar magnitude of PSS shift, is PH is the only 
one aware of asynchrony? 10/37 participants consistently reported a visual or auditory lead on more 
than 75% of synchronous trials. Thus for these participants, the difference between veridically 
synchronous stimuli and their personal PSS was actually greater than their just noticeable difference 
for perceiving asynchrony. In other words, these subjects seemed to reliably perceive physically 
synchronous stimuli as asynchronous, at least under laboratory conditions. 
 
Expt 2: McGurk with normative sample 
PH’s two lesions in pons and STN seem well placed to disrupt audition and/or timing (Halverson 
and Freeman, 2010; Kolomiets et al., 2001; Teki et al., 2011), and might explain the auditory 
lagging observed in tMcG. But how could the same lesions also produce an opposite shift in PSS, 
and PH’s corresponding experience of auditory leading?  
 
It may be instructive to note that in PH our two measures of sensory timing are distributed 
symmetrically around zero auditory lag. Thus despite the temporal disparity between mechanisms it 
seems that on average across measures he can still achieve near-veridical timing (see General 
Discussion for further elaboration). It is suggested that in order to maintain veridical performance, 
and thus continue to live in the ‘present moment’, pathological auditory slowing within impaired 
mechanisms is balanced by perceiving auditory timing in preserved mechanisms as slightly earlier 
  
16 
than veridical. In other words the asynchronies obtained within each mechanism might have been 
renormalised relative to the average asynchrony across mechanisms. 
 
Such renormalisation might explain how veridical perception is maintained on average following 
pathological disruption of timing in selected mechanisms, but for neurologically healthy people the 
prediction is highly counterintuitive: individual differences (Stone et al., 2001) which bias one 
measure of subjective timing in one direction (e.g. auditory lead for PSS) might be associated with 
the opposite bias in other measures (e.g. auditory lag for tMcG, or vice versa). This prediction of a 
negative correlation contrasts with the positive correlation predicted if synchronising mechanisms 
brought individual differences in PSS (Stone et al., 2001) and tMcG into agreement (Fujisaki et al., 
2004; Harris et al., 2008; Spence and Squire, 2003; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010).  
 
To test this we measured the correlation between PSS and tMcG, across the whole sample of young 
and older participants (total N=37). As predicted by the compensation hypothesis above, the 
correlation was significantly negative [N=38, Pearson’s rho=-.47, p=.003, Figure 4a]. Yet on 
average performance on both measures remained near-veridical (Figure 3). 
 
Expt 3: Stream-Bounce 
Is this apparent repulsion of timing measures just a speech-specific phenomenon? We tested this 
with the Stream-Bounce illusion (Sekuler et al., 1997, Figure 1), in which two approaching ‘balls’ 
may appear to bounce off each other when their collision coincides with a sound, rather than 
streaming past each other. As before, there were two questions after each trial. The first probed the 
temporal order of the sound relative to the visual collision. The second required participants to 
judge whether they saw the balls bouncing off each other or streaming through each other, from 
which we estimated the asynchrony for maximum ‘bounce’ (tBounce). We again found a negative 
correlation between PSS and tBounce [Pearson’s rho = -0.54, p=.001, for 24 new young 
participants, Figure 4b]. Note that in contrast to the McGurk illusion for speech where vision 
influences hearing, in this non-speech illusion, hearing influences vision. Thus we may infer that 
this negative correlation pattern, replicated for speech and non-speech, and in both directions of 
audiovisual influence, reflects a general (rather than stimulus- or task-specific) characteristic of 
perception. 
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General Discussion  
Our psychophysical investigation of PH confirmed his subjective report of lips leading voices, 
when measured using temporal order judgements (TOJ), but revealed the opposite bias for McGurk 
integration, with temporal tuning favouring auditory lagging. Thus PH suffers not only from an 
acquired disruption of synchronisation, but also a violation of perceptual unity of timing across 
different aspects of the same pairing of auditory and visual stimuli. Neurologically normal 
individuals also showed a comparable opponency between our two measures (in speech and non-
speech and in both directions of audiovisual influence): thus if one subject showed auditory lagging 
for TOJ, the McGurk measure tended to show auditory leading (or vice versa). Altogether, these 
counterintuitive findings suggest that perception of synchrony and integration depend on distinct 
rather than common synchronising mechanisms, and reveal one strategy by which how the brain 
might achieve near-veridical perception of the timing of multisensory events, at least on average, 
despite the evident temporal disunity of sensory processing. 
 
How unusual is PH? 
If specialised mechanisms existed to synchronise senses in normal brains, one would expect to find 
more cases of acquired sensory desynchronisation when such mechanisms are lesioned (Wiener et 
al., 2011). There has only been one previous report, of patient AWF (Hamilton et al., 2006). 
However the similarity with PH is difficult to assess, as the direction of AWF’s acquired ‘temporal 
mismatch’ was not specified, and he was only tested with synchronous stimuli. AWF showed no 
McGurk effect while PH did when tested with asynchronous (auditory leading) stimuli. AWF’s 
lesions are also in a quite different location, in right parietal cortex, while PH’s lesions are in mid-
brain and brainstem. We can at least claim that the present case is the first to be reported of an 
acquired subjective auditory lead, which is speech-specific and accompanied with an auditory lag 
for optimal McGurk integration. 
 
Surprisingly, some healthy participants also showed large deviations of PSS; indeed for some, 
synchronous stimuli were just-noticeably asynchronous. Thus it seems PH is not so unusual in 
terms of experiencing a mismatch in audiovisual timing. Such ubiquitous sensory asynchrony 
further undermines support for the existence of specialised synchronisation mechanisms. It also 
raises the obvious question of why only PH is aware of his asynchrony in his everyday life. It is 
possible that our TOJ results from normal participants are specific to our laboratory conditions. In 
the outside world we learn to expect that when auditory and visual events originate from the same 
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source, they are also very likely to occur simultaneously, regardless of their sensory timing. Under 
this unity assumption (Vatakis and Spence, 2007; Welch and Warren, 1980) our perception might 
tend to rely more on this expectation than any sensory evidence of asynchrony. Our paradigm, by 
contrast, presented a randomised range of asynchronous stimuli with no feedback about which was 
actually synchronous. In this situation the unity assumption cannot be confidently applied, and 
perceptions may rely more on asynchronous sensory inputs than prior expectations. Under such 
conditions even neurologically healthy subjects might notice an asynchrony given actually 
synchronous stimuli. As for PH, his subjective asynchrony (which changed unexpectedly later in 
life) might just be too great for him to reconcile with the assumption of unity, even outside the lab 
(Vatakis and Spence, 2007; Welch and Warren, 1980). 
 
While PH’s auditory lead for PSS is not statistically abnormal, his auditory lag for optimal McGurk 
is (tMcG). This might be explained if the principle impairment caused by his lesions is actually a 
slowing of auditory processing, consistent with the location of his lesion on a tract connecting with 
the inferior colliculus, part of the early auditory system (see Supplementary Materials for an 
analysis of tractography). 
 
The dissociation between PH's temporal tuning of subjective simultaneity in temporal order 
judgements, versus for phoneme discrimination, suggests that each different task may probe 
different mechanisms, each subject to their own neural asynchronies (Aschersleben and Prinz, 
1995). For example, one mechanism might be involved in speech integration and the other in 
judging sensory synchrony (Calvert, 2001; Miller & D’Esposito, 2005; Vroomen & Stekelenburg, 
2011). The further dissociation between PSS for speech versus non-speech would be consistent with 
the existence of special mechanisms for these different stimulus types (Vatakis et al., 2008). 
Alternatively the same mechanisms might have different temporal tunings depending on the low-
level characteristics of the specific stimulus presented (Vroomen and Stekelenburg, 2011). From 
these dissociations it seems, at least for PH, that there are indeed multiple clocks (see Introduction), 
whose discrepant timings cannot be reconciled. 
 
How closely do measures of integration normally correspond with measures of synchrony? 
An appealing intuition is that single physical events should be associated with a unitary percept 
(Welch and Warren, 1980). Evidence suggests that the brain strives for (Vatakis and Spence, 2007), 
and benefits from (Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2007, 2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007) such unity. 
  
19 
But PH shows a dramatic failure of unity, with voices subjectively leading lip-movements, at the 
same time as effectively lagging lip-movements for the purposes of integration. Is PH just an 
exception to the putative rule that unity is normally achieved? Previous studies with normal 
participants (using the original paradigm borrowed here) have also reported ‘dual perception’ of 
good lip-voice integration despite a detectable audiovisual asynchrony (Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 
2007). However such violations were small when measured on average across participants, and 
could arguably have reflected different decision criteria for the two concurrent judgements. The 
TOJ task may be particularly susceptible to response biases (García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 
2012; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2009; Van Eijk et al., 2008). However such criterion or response bias 
effects, or attentional biases such as prior-entry (Spence and Parise, 2010; Spence et al., 2001) 
cannot easily explain away the negative correlation we show in Figure 4 (see our Supplementary 
Discussion). Our analysis of individual differences reveals the true extent to which subjective unity 
is routinely violated in normal participants, who can sometimes perceive, concurrently, different 
aspects of a single pair of auditory and visual events to be occurring at quite different times relative 
to each other. 
 
Theoretical accounts 
Over the years there have been a variety of approaches to the problem of how temporal unity can be 
maintained across asynchronous processes in the brain (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012). One solution 
might be to have dedicated mechanisms for timing events, via a supramodal mechanism (Hanson et 
al., 2008; Treisman, 1963), or specialised timing mechanisms residing in cerebellum or basal 
ganglia (Ivry and Spencer, 2004), functioning to provide a common time code for multisensory 
events.. Timing discrepancies might also be minimised (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012), via temporal 
ventriloquism (Freeman and Driver, 2008; Morein-Zamir, Soto-Faraco, and Kingstone, 2003; 
Vroomen and de Gelder, 2004), or by selectively delaying one modality (Sternberg and Knoll, 
1973), or by recalibration of temporal codes (Fujisaki et al., 2004), so that a frequently occurring 
neural asynchrony is perceived as synchronous. Compensatory adjustments might also be made in a 
context-sensitive way, for example taking into account the distance of events from the observer 
(Harris et al., 2008) or the prior likelihood that the causal events are actually synchronous or not 
(Miyazaki et al., 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012). 
 
The above accounts, on first sight, seem difficult to square with the present evidence of disunity, 
and particularly the negative correlation between different measures of audiovisual timing (Figure 
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4). Our results suggest that timing discrepancies between mechanisms serving performance of our 
synchronisation and integration tasks cannot be fully reconciled. However, as we explain below 
(and in Figure 5), our evidence is still consistent with the mainstream assumption that the brain 
adjusts for differences in neural timing between distinct modalities. Our account just makes explicit 
the assumption that this adjustment is made based on average differences in timing: either between 
modalities (Harris et al., 2008), or in principle more generally between cognitive processes or any 
arbitrary groupings of temporally discrepant mechanisms. 
 
Temporal renormalisation 
Given the present evidence that disparities in timing for different tasks cannot be fully minimised, 
there appears to be no escape from the multiple-clocks problem: ‘with one clock you always know 
the time; with two you are never sure'. But of course, Segal’s maxim is misleading. Given a room 
full of clocks, each independently subject to inaccuracies, our best guess at the correct time comes 
from the average across all clocks. Thus statistically, the more clocks we have the better for 
accurately estimating this average. Such averaging may be how the brain solves the multiple-clocks 
problem. This problem is that different auditory and visual stimuli are processed at different speeds, 
and arrive at different mechanisms (e.g. contributing to synchrony and integration judgements 
respectively) at different times, resulting in a distribution of neural timings measured across the 
different mechanisms. From the point of view of an individual mechanism contributing to this 
distribution, it is uncertain to what extent the timing of its inputs reflects the true external timing of 
events or just internal processing delays (Scharnowski et al., 2013). But the average over the 
distribution provides a purer estimate of the neural timing that relates most reliably to the true 
timing of external events (see Figure 5 for a schematic illustration, and Supplementary Discussion 
of how this could apply before and/or after unimodal signals). We propose that discrepancies in 
timing between mechanisms are not minimised but perceived relative to their average timing. 
 
In contrast to the other theoretical alternatives, this temporal renormalisation theory provides a 
fuller and more explicit account of all of our paradoxical findings: why a lesion produces opposite 
lags in different measures; why in normal participants different measures of subjective timing 
appear mutually repulsive, and how despite such disunity perception remains near-veridical on 
average across measures. To see how these phenomena emerge, note that in the multiple clocks 
analogy, if one clock is particularly slow then this will bias the average, relative to which even the 
correct clocks will seem to be fast. In the brain, the mean neural delay of each sensory modality 
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could also be attracted to particularly slow (or fast) neural events such that even events with 
relatively normal timing may be perceived as slightly fast (or slow). In PH, the integrative 
mechanisms probed by the McGurk task may have an unusually delayed auditory input, due to a 
selective brain lesion. The central tendency of the distribution will shift towards auditory lags, and 
relative to this, auditory signals from other unaffected mechanisms, such as those performing 
temporal order judgement, will now be perceived to be leading. Yet on average across these 
measures, and despite pathological disruptions of timing, performance remains near-veridical. 
Renormalisation also explains the negative correlation we observed in healthy individuals, for 
whom auditory and visual timing may vary naturally in a similar (or opposite) direction to PH: in 
different people the greater the deviation in the auditory lead (lag) direction for some mechanisms, 
the more auditory leading (lagging) will be reported for other mechanisms, relative to the mean 
asynchrony, thus resulting in an apparent antagonism between mechanisms. Given that the mean 
neural asynchrony most reliably relates to external synchrony (under the unity assumption), 
renormalisation explains how near-veridical performance is maintained on average, across 
mechanisms and also across subjects. 
 
Simulation 
Computations based on statistical distributions are routinely proposed in Bayesian theories of 
perception (Miyazaki et al., 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012), while functions similar to averaging 
over such distributions have been considered in theories of population coding (Roach, Heron, 
Whitaker, and McGraw, 2011). Assuming similar mechanisms in principle, we performed a simple 
simulation, in which we plotted values sampled from two random variables (‘clocks’), after 
subtracting each from the average across a population of clocks. We found that this simple 
renormalisation model could accurately simulate the negative correlation observed (see 
Supplementary Methods S2 and Supplementary Figure 2 for further details). This serves to 
demonstrate how the observed negative correlation phenomenon might emerge simply as a 
consequence of renormalisation, and not due to any explicit antagonism between mechanisms. 
 
Conclusions 
Neuroscientists and philosophers have long pondered the relationship between subjective and neural 
timing (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1995; Harris et al., 2008; Spence and Squire, 2003; Zeki and 
Bartels, 1998). Our observations with PH and with neurologically healthy participants confirm that 
perception is characterised fundamentally by asynchrony and disunity: different aspects of the same 
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pair of multisensory stimuli may be perceived with different asynchronies, and these discrepancies 
cannot be fully minimised. But an apparent antagonism between complementary measures of 
subjective timing reveals a superordinate principle, by which discrepant timings in the brain may 
nevertheless be renormalised to their average neural timing. By relating subjective timing to 
average neural timing, temporal renormalisation neatly explains (1) why after a lesion PH 
experiences auditory leading in one task but the opposite auditory lead in another, (2) why different 
timing measures are negatively correlated across normal individuals, and (3) how the brain might 
tell the time from multiple clocks, with near-veridical accuracy, without needing resynchronising 
mechanisms. 
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Supplementary Information 
S 1. Diffusion Tensor Imaging 
Supplementary Figure 1: T2 weighted images with DTI for lesion 2 
S2. Supplementary Discussion of decisional or attentional interpretations 
S3. Supplementary Discussion of renormalisation theory 
S4. Simulation of renormalisation model 
Supplementary Figure 2: Simulation results 
 
Supplementary Videos 
McGurk stimulus demo: Four combinations, played consecutively:  
1. auditory /ba/ with visual [ba]: congruent 
2. auditory /ba/ with visual [ga] (incongruent: McGurk effect sounds like “da”) 
3. auditory /da/ with visual [ba] (incongruent: McGurk effect sounds like “ba”) 
4. auditory /da/ with visual [da]: congruent 
Stream-bounce stimulus demo. Two examples, played consecutively:  
1. beep simultaneous with visual collision  
2. beep lags visual collision by 150ms 
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Table legends 
 
Table 1 Neuropsychological test results for PH 
 
Table 2 Mean results from McGurk experiment 
 
 
Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 
T2 weighted images of both lesion sites, outlined in red. 
 
Figure 2.  
Trial sequence and stimuli for McGurk (top row) and Stream-Bounce illusions (bottom).  
 
Figure 3.  
Psychometric data for PH (with black data points and interpolation using a broken line), and for 
healthy young (black continuous function) and older (grey) groups. a) Temporal order judgements: 
proportion of 'voice second' reports (y-axis) for different auditory lags (negative x-values for 
auditory lead), interpolated with a logistic function. Horizontals indicate the point of subjective 
simultaneity (PSS) with 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped estimates for PH and on 
SEMean for controls. b) Phoneme discrimination task: proportion of responses following lip 
movement, averaged across incongruous conditions only, interpolated using Asymmetric Double 
Sigmoids. Auditory lag for maximum McGurk interference (tMcG) was read off at the maximum. 
 
Figure 4.  
PSS (x-axis) plotted against asynchrony for maximum a) McGurk, i.e. tMcG (open circle: PH; grey: 
older; black: young) and b) bounce illusions (tBounce).  
 
Figure 5:  
Temporal renormalisation theory: hypothetical relationship between neural and subjective 
audiovisual asynchrony. Top left: Signals from synchronous auditory and visual stimuli 
(represented by blue and red disks) converge on different audiovisual mechanisms in the brain via 
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different routes (grey disks). For individual mechanisms the actual stimulus timing cannot be 
dissociated from the propagation latency.  
 
Top right: schematic of the evoked distribution of neural asynchronies, across mechanisms, plotting 
probability of different asynchronies, as a function of neural asynchrony, with increasing delays of 
auditory signals relative to visual towards the right. The x-axis text refers to the subjective 
experience of auditory lead, simultaneity, or auditory lag, given these different neural asynchronies. 
The neural asynchrony at the central tendency of the distribution is the one which relates most 
reliably to the objective timing of the auditory and visual stimuli, after delays within individual 
mechanisms have been averaged out. Following experience with this distribution in natural contexts 
where objective synchrony is likely, tasks probing mechanisms registering asynchronies near this 
average may evoke perception of synchrony (marked with a dotted line and ‘Simult’); asynchronies 
registered within other mechanisms are perceived in proportion to their distance from the average. 
 
Lower left: an example where auditory inputs to a subset of mechanisms (towards the right) are 
particularly delayed. For patient PH it is assumed that these mechanisms contribute to the temporal 
tuning of the McGurk illusion (labelled McG; see main text), while mechanisms involved in 
temporal order judgement are preserved.  
 
Lower right: the bimodal distribution resulting from delayed auditory input for the McGurk task. 
The mean of the distribution has shifted towards the auditory-lagged mechanisms serving the 
McGurk task (labelled McG). The perceived asynchrony within each mechanism is renormalised to 
this new distribution mean. The result is that neural asynchronies for unaffected mechanisms (here 
labelled TOJ) originally perceived as synchronous (as in the top example) are now perceived as 
auditory leading. 
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Table 1 Neuropsychological test results for PH 
 
Test PH 
Wechlser abbreviated scale of intelligence (The 
 
 
Full scale IQ 136 
Verbal IQ 133 
Performance IQ 129 
  
Test of everyday attention  
Elevator counting 6/7 
Elevator counting with distraction 10/10 
  
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery 
 
 
Shape detection 20/20 
Incomplete Letters 20/20 
Sillhouettes 19/30 
Object decision 19/20 
Dot counting 10/10 
Position discrimination 20/20 
Number location 9/10 
Cube analysis 10/10 
  
Sentence repetition (auditory only) 22/22 
Low + high frequency word repetition 100% 
  
Praxis Normal 
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Table 2 Mean results from McGurk experiment 
 
Mean results from McGurk experiment 
 
 N PSS
1 
CI
2 
JND
3 
CI tMcG
4 
CI 
PH 1 210 ±40 93 ±35 -240 ±56 
Older 10 19 ±94 176 ±64 21 ±78 
Younger 27 31 ±57 272 ±81 62 ±42 
 
1. PSS: Point of subjective simultaneity, in milliseconds; positive values for auditory lag, negative for 
auditory lead. 
2. CI: 95% confidence interval (ms); estimated for PH by bootstrapping and for controls from SEMean. 
3. JND: Just noticeable difference from subjective simultaneity (ms). 
4. tMcG: asynchrony for maximum McGurk effect (ms). Positive values for auditory lag 
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Freeman et al: Sight and sound out of synch. 
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S1. Diffusion Tensor Imaging 
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) was undertaken using images from healthy subjects, 
to identify brain regions which are connected to the lesion sites. Brain images from 
six neurologically normal right-handed males were registered together using 
DARTEL (in part of SPM toolbox for Matlab, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Lesion 
masks were delineated by first defining a sphere around each of the patient’s lesions, 
and then applying an intensity threshold to define the actual lesion ROI in a non-
biased fashion. These were warped to 1mm isotropic MNI space and then back 
projected to individual healthy subject space. Lesion 1 was moved to the individual 
healthy subject space using DARTEL inverse warp. Lesion 2 was moved to standard 
space using the SUIT toolbox (optimised for cerebello-brainstem registration). 
Tractography was performed from every individual voxel in subject space using FSL 
ProbtrackX (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fdt/fdt_probtrackx.html). Each voxel was 
sampled 5000 times, with curvature threshold corresponding to a minimum angle of 
80 degrees. Individual raw diffusion profiles were thresholded at 1% and binarised. 
All were moved back to standard space, and averaged. 
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Supplementary Figure 1: T2 weighted images with DTI tracts marked in green and 
lesion 2 in red in panel 3 (left pons).  
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S2. Supplementary Discussion of decisional or attentional interpretations 
In Soto-Faraco & Alsius (2007), discrepancies between measures might arguably 
have reflected differences in criterion for the two concurrent judgements. Could 
apparent disunity between our two measures of subjective timing also be explained in 
terms of differences in decision criteria assigned to different tasks? This class of 
explanation has been used to account for discrepancies between different measures of 
PSS, obtained from temporal order judgements and simultaneity judgements (García-
Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2012; Schneider and Bavelier, 2003; Van Eijk, 
Kohlrausch, Juola, and Van De Par, 2008), which show a null correlation (Van Eijk et 
al., 2008). Individual variability could also be caused by differences in weighting of 
attention to vision versus audition, causing prior entry effects (Spence and Parise, 
2010; Spence, Shore, and Klein, 2001). But while it is easy to imagine how 
inconsistent decisional or attentional biases could obscure a positive correlation 
between two complementary measures, it is harder to explain how biases could result 
in a negative correlation. Considering the dual-task context of the just Stream-Bounce 
experiment for now, two possible forms of bias may be distinguished: firstly, a bias 
which results in an unequal tendency to choose one of two possible responses, and 
secondly, a bias in which the second response is contingent on the first. Considering 
the first kind, responses might be biased, for example, towards the ‘voice second’ and 
‘bounce’ responses. This would shift the psychometric function for TOJ horizontally, 
resulting PSS values biased towards greater auditory lag. However the same response 
bias could only increase the height of the ‘bounce‘ function, and could not shift the 
location of its peak along the asynchrony axis. With the second response-contingent 
type of bias, subjects might tend to press the same key twice for both tasks, or even 
tend to switch to the opposite key for the second keypress. This could increase or 
decrease the proportion of ‘bounce’ responses as a function of auditory lag, resulting 
in a shift of tBounce values, but would have no effect on PSS (as this is the first 
response upon which the second is contingent). It can therefore be seen that neither of 
these two biases alone would result in a negative correlation. Only the specific 
combination of the first bias, which shifts PSS, with the second bias towards making 
opposite responses for the second question, thus shifting tBounce in the opposite 
direction, could in principle create a negative correlation. The situation is even more 
complicated in the McGurk experiment, in which the direction of the second bias 
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would have to depend on the specific stimulus context, because the McGurk illusion 
is classified by ‘ba‘ responses when the actual stimulus is /da/ is heard and ‘da‘ 
responses when the actual auditory stimulus is /ba/. However by the nature of this 
illusion, such perceptual discrimination is by definition extremely difficult. In 
conclusion, a complete explanation based on response biases may arguably be ruled 
out on grounds of implausibility and parsimony. 
 
S3. Supplementary Discussion of renormalisation theory 
Temporal renormalisation could be applied before and/or after unimodal signals are 
combined, given different assumptions. In the unimodal case, the average time of 
auditory neural events could be computed separately from visual, and a compensatory 
adjustment made to the perceived timing so that signals whose timings are close to 
their average are perceived as happening 'now'. This unimodal adjustment would have 
to be propagated to the stage of multimodal convergence, so that unimodal signals 
whose timings are close to their unimodal average are perceived as synchronous. 
Those signals further from the average in either modality would then be perceived as 
asynchronous. However this kind of unimodal compensation would not help to 
compensate for audiovisual asynchronies resulting from different propagation 
latencies as signals converge on different multimodal mechanisms.  
 
An alternative more general formulation might assume that adjustments are made 
after signals are combined, forming a distribution of audiovisual asynchronies. In 
natural contexts where most multisensory events occurring within a short interval can 
be generally assumed to originate from a synchronous source (i.e. the unity 
assumption), the evoked distribution of internal asynchronies could be used to 
construct a window of simultaneity:  asynchronies close to the centroid of the 
distribution will be perceived as simultaneous; conversely outlying asynchronies 
(relative to the width of the distribution) may be more likely to be caused by truly 
asynchronous external events, and perceived as such. An advantage of this scheme is 
that the window of simultaneity could be constructed fairly rapidly, on the basis of the 
peak and spread of arbitrary distributions resulting from any combination of stimuli at 
any observer distance. This therefore provides a mechanism for achieving 
simultaneity constancy (at least at a first approximation) while avoiding the potential 
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complexities of having to learn the specific internal asynchronies evoked by 
potentially many different stimuli in many different contexts (Harris, Harrar, Jaekl, 
and Kopinska, 2008). 
!
S4. Simulation of renormalisation model 
To see whether temporal renormalisation could explain the negative correlation 
observed, we performed a simple simulation. We generated two noisy 'clocks' by 
randomly sampling from a normal distribution with the same N, means and standard 
deviations as each of the original PSS and tMcG datasets. The renormalisation idea 
assumes that asynchronies measured by each clock are each subtracted from the 
average across the distribution of all clocks. Clearly, if there were only two 
independent clocks, the result would be a perfect negative correlation, with a 
regression slope of -1. We therefore tested how the slope depended on adding further 
independently noisy variables to the distribution, with the statistics derived from the 
combination of our two original datasets. These could represent additional 
independent clocks, which were not probed by either of our two tasks, or just general 
noisiness of perception or responses. It was sufficient to add just one additional 
variable to simulate the results we obtained and to obtain a similar regression slope. 
Supplementary Figure 3a shows an example of one such simulated datasets, and 
Supplementary Figure 3b shows the regression slope as a function of number of 
additional noisy variables, with shaded regions indicating 95% confidence intervals 
based on 1000 simulations. The horizontal line indicates the slope obtained with 38 
participants in the original McGurk experiment. 
 ! 6!
 
Supplementary Figure 2: Simulation results 
See text above for details. 
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